

*Responses:* 18,620 Burden Hours: 64,310.

*Abstract:* The LESP is being conducted in response to the legislative requirement in P.L. 103-382, Section 1501 to assess the implementation of Title I and related education reforms. The information will be used to examine changes—over a 3-year period—that are occurring in schools and classrooms. Teachers and teacher aides will complete a mail survey, and district Title I administrators, principals, school-based staff, and parents will be interviewed during on-site field work.

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## DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

### Record of decision for the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement

**AGENCY:** Department of Energy.

**ACTION:** Record of Decision.

**SUMMARY:** The Department of Energy (DOE) has decided to implement a program to provide for safe and secure storage of weapons-usable fissile materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium [HEU]) and a strategy for the disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium, as specified in the Preferred Alternative in the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (S&D Final PEIS, DOE/EIS-0229, December 1996). The fundamental purpose of the program is to maintain a high standard of security and accounting for these materials while in storage, and to ensure that plutonium produced for nuclear weapons and declared excess to national security needs (now, or in the future) is never again used for nuclear weapons.

DOE will consolidate the storage of weapons-usable plutonium by upgrading and expanding existing and planned facilities at the Pantex Plant in Texas and the Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina, and continue the storage of weapons-usable HEU at DOE's Y-12 Plant at the Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) in Tennessee, in upgraded and, as HEU is dispositioned, consolidated facilities. After certain conditions are met, most plutonium now stored at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS) in Colorado will be moved to Pantex and SRS. Plutonium currently stored at the Hanford Site (Hanford), the Idaho

National Engineering Laboratory (INEL), and the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) will remain at those sites until disposition (or movement to lag storage at the disposition facilities).

DOE's strategy for disposition of surplus plutonium is to pursue an approach that allows immobilization of surplus plutonium in glass or ceramic material for disposal in a geologic repository pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, and burning of some of the surplus plutonium as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing, domestic, commercial reactors, with subsequent disposal of the spent fuel in a geologic repository pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. DOE may also burn MOX fuel in Canadian Deuterium Uranium [CANDU] reactors in the event of an appropriate agreement among Russia, Canada, and the United States, as discussed below. The timing and extent to which either or both of these disposition approaches (immobilization or MOX) are ultimately deployed will depend upon the results of future technology development and demonstrations, follow-on (tiered) site-specific environmental review, contract negotiations, and detailed cost reviews, as well as nonproliferation considerations, and agreements with Russia and other nations. DOE's program will be subject to the highest standards of safeguards and security throughout all aspects of storage, transportation, and processing, and will include appropriate International Atomic Energy Agency verification.

Due to technology, complexity, timing, cost, and other factors that would be involved in purifying certain plutonium materials to make them suitable for potential use in MOX fuel, approximately 30 percent of the total quantity of plutonium (that has or may be declared surplus to defense needs) would require extensive purification to use in MOX fuel, and therefore will likely be immobilized. DOE will immobilize at least 8 metric tons (MT) of currently declared surplus plutonium materials that DOE has already determined are not suitable for use in MOX fuel. DOE reserves the option of using the immobilization approach for all of the surplus plutonium.

The exact locations for disposition facilities will be determined pursuant to a follow-on, site-specific disposition environmental impact statement (EIS) as well as cost, technical and nonproliferation studies. However, DOE has decided to narrow the field of candidate disposition sites. DOE has decided that a vitrification or immobilization facility (collocated with a plutonium conversion facility) will be

located at either Hanford or SRS, that a potential MOX fuel fabrication facility will be located at Hanford, INEL, Pantex, or SRS (only one site), and that a "pit" disassembly and conversion facility will be located at Hanford, INEL, Pantex, or SRS (only one site). ("Pits" are weapons components containing plutonium.) The specific reactors, and their locations, that may be used to burn the MOX fuel will depend on contract negotiations, licensing, and environmental reviews. Because there are a number of technology variations that could be used for immobilization, DOE will also determine the specific immobilization technology based on the follow-on EIS, technology developments, cost information, and nonproliferation considerations. Based on current technological and cost information, DOE anticipates that the follow-on EIS will identify, as part of the proposed action, immobilizing a portion of the surplus plutonium using the "can-in-canister" technology at the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) at the Savannah River Site.

The use of MOX fuel in existing reactors would be undertaken in a manner that is consistent with the United States' policy objective on the irreversibility of the nuclear disarmament process and the United States' policy discouraging the civilian use of plutonium. To this end, implementing the MOX alternative would include government ownership and control of the MOX fuel fabrication facility at a DOE site, and use of the facility only for the surplus plutonium disposition program. There would be no reprocessing or subsequent reuse of spent MOX fuel. The MOX fuel would be used in a once-through fuel cycle in existing reactors, with appropriate arrangements, including contractual or licensing provisions, limiting use of MOX fuel to surplus plutonium disposition.

The Department of Energy also retains the option of using MOX fuel in Canadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactors in Canada in the event a multilateral agreement is negotiated among Russia, Canada, and the United States to use CANDU reactors for surplus United States' and Russian plutonium. DOE will engage in a test and demonstration program for CANDU MOX fuel as appropriate and consistent with future cooperative efforts with Russia and Canada.

These efforts will provide the basis and flexibility for the United States to initiate disposition efforts either multilaterally or bilaterally through negotiations with other nations, or unilaterally as an example to Russia and

other nations. Disposition of the surplus plutonium will serve as a nonproliferation and disarmament example, encourage similar actions by Russia and other nations, and foster multilateral or bilateral disposition efforts and agreements.

**EFFECTIVE DATE:** The decisions set forth in this Record of Decision (ROD) are effective upon issuance of this document, in accordance with DOE's National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Implementing Procedures and Guidelines (10 CFR Part 1021) and the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations implementing NEPA (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508).

**ADDRESSES:** Copies of the S&D Final PEIS, the Technical Summary Report For Long-Term Storage of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials, the Technical Summary Report for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium Disposition, the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Storage and Plutonium Disposition, and this ROD may be obtained by writing to the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, MD-4, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, or by calling (202) 586-4513. The 56-page Summary of the S&D Final PEIS, the other documents noted above (other than the full PEIS), and this ROD are also available on the Fissile Materials Disposition World Wide Web Page at: <http://web.fie.com/htdoc/fed/DOE/fsl/pub/menu/any/>

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** For information on the storage and disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials program or this ROD contact: Mr. J. David Nulton, Director, NEPA Compliance and Outreach, Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (MD-4), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, telephone (202) 586-4513.

For information on the DOE NEPA process, contact: Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Assistance (EH-42), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Ave., SW, Washington, DC 20585, telephone (202) 586-4600 or leave a message at (800) 472-2756.

#### **SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:**

##### **I. Background**

The end of the Cold War has created a legacy of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials both in the United States and the former Soviet Union. Further agreements on disarmament may increase the surplus quantities of

these materials. The global stockpiles of weapons-usable fissile materials pose a danger to national and international security in the form of potential proliferation of nuclear weapons and the potential for environmental, safety, and health consequences if the materials are not properly safeguarded and managed.

In September 1993, President Clinton issued a Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy in response to the growing threat of nuclear proliferation. Further, in January 1994, President Clinton and Russia's President Yeltsin issued a Joint Statement Between the United States and Russia on Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Means of Their Delivery. In accordance with these policies, the focus of the U.S. nonproliferation efforts in this regard is five-fold: (i) To secure nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union; (ii) to assure safe, secure, long-term storage and disposition of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials; (iii) to establish transparent and irreversible nuclear arms reductions; (iv) to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime; and (v) to control nuclear exports. The policy also states that the United States will not encourage the civil use of plutonium and that the United States does not engage in plutonium reprocessing for either nuclear power or nuclear explosive purposes.

To demonstrate the United States' commitment to these objectives, President Clinton announced on March 1, 1995, that approximately 200 metric tons of U.S.-origin weapons-usable fissile materials, of which 165 metric tons are HEU and 38 metric tons are weapons-grade plutonium, had been declared surplus to the United States' defense needs.<sup>1</sup> The safe and secure storage of weapons-usable plutonium and HEU, and the disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium, consistent with the Preferred Alternative in the S&D Final PEIS and the decisions described in section V of this ROD, are consistent with the President's nonproliferation policy.

<sup>1</sup> The Secretary of Energy's Openness Initiative announcement of February 6, 1996, announced that the United States has about 213 metric tons of surplus fissile materials, including the 200 metric tons the President announced in March, 1995. Of the 213 metric tons of surplus materials, the Openness Initiative announcement indicated that about 174.3 metric tons are HEU and about 38.2 metric tons are weapons-grade plutonium. Additional quantities of plutonium may be declared surplus in the future; therefore, the S&D Final PEIS analyzes the disposition of a nominal 50 metric tons of plutonium, as well as the storage of 89 metric tons of plutonium and 994 metric tons of HEU.

##### **II. Decisions Made in This ROD**

This ROD encompasses two categories of decisions: (1) The sites and facilities for storage of non-surplus weapons-usable plutonium and HEU, and storage of surplus plutonium and HEU pending disposition; and (2) the programmatic strategy for disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium. This ROD does not encompass the final selection of sites for plutonium disposition facilities, nor the extent to which the two plutonium disposition approaches (immobilization or MOX) will ultimately be implemented. Those decisions will be made pursuant to a follow-on EIS. However, DOE does announce in this ROD that the slate of candidate sites for plutonium disposition has been narrowed. This ROD does not include decisions about the disposition of surplus HEU, which were made in July 1996 in the separate ROD for the Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium Final Environmental Impact Statement, 61 FR 40619 (Aug. 5, 1996).<sup>2</sup>

##### **III. NEPA Process**

###### **A. S&D Draft PEIS**

On June 21, 1994, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the Federal Register (59 FR 31985) to prepare a Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (S&D PEIS), which was originally to address the storage and disposition of both plutonium and HEU. DOE subsequently concluded that a separate EIS on surplus HEU disposition would be appropriate. Accordingly, DOE published a notice in the Federal Register (60 FR 17344) on April 5, 1995, to inform the public of the proposed plan to prepare a separate EIS for the disposition of surplus HEU.

DOE published an implementation plan (IP) for the S&D PEIS in March 1995 (DOE/EIS-0229-IP). The IP recorded the issues identified during the scoping process, indicated how they would be addressed in the S&D PEIS, and provided guidance for the preparation of the S&D PEIS. DOE issued the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (S&D Draft PEIS, DOE/EIS-0229-D) for public comment in February 1996. On March 8, 1996, both DOE and the Environmental Protection

<sup>2</sup> The material considered in the S&D Final PEIS, and covered by the decisions in this ROD, does not include spent nuclear fuel, irradiated targets, uranium-233, plutonium-238, plutonium residues of less than 50-percent plutonium by weight, or weapons program materials-in-use.

Agency (EPA) published Notices of Availability of the S&D Draft PEIS in the Federal Register (61 FR 9443 and 61 9450), announcing a public comment period from March 8 until May 7, 1996. In response to requests from the public, DOE on May 13, 1996 published another Notice in the Federal Register (61 FR 22038) announcing an extension of the comment period until June 7, 1996. Eight public meetings on the S&D Draft PEIS were held during March and April 1996 in Washington, DC and in the vicinity of the DOE sites under consideration for the proposed actions.

During the 92-day public comment period, the public was encouraged to provide comments via mail, toll-free fax, electronic bulletin board (Internet), and toll-free telephone recording device. By these means, DOE received 8,442 comments from 6,543 individuals and organizations for consideration. In addition, 250 oral comments were recorded from some of the 734 individuals who attended the eight public meetings. All of the comments received, and the Department's responses to them, are presented in Volume IV (the Comment Response Document) of the S&D Final PEIS. All of the comments were considered in preparation of the S&D Final PEIS, and in many cases resulted in changes to the document. The Notice of Availability for the S&D Final PEIS was published by EPA in the Federal Register on December 13, 1996 (61 FR 65572). DOE published its own Notice of Availability for the S&D Final PEIS in the Federal Register on December 19, 1996 (61 FR 67001).

## B. Alternatives Considered

The S&D PEIS analyzes the reasonable action alternatives in addition to the Preferred Alternative and the No Action Alternative. The Preferred Alternative, which is described below in section V, Decisions, and which DOE has decided to implement, represents a combination of alternatives for both storage and disposition.

### 1. The Proposed Action

The proposed action, as described in the S&D PEIS, would involve the following actions for U.S. weapons-usable fissile materials:

- Storage—provide a long-term storage system (for up to 50 years) for non-surplus plutonium and HEU that meets the Stored Weapons Standard<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup>The "Stored Weapons Standard" for weapons-usable fissile materials storage was initially defined in Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, National Academy of Sciences, 1994. DOE defines the Stored Weapons Standard as follows: The high standards of security and

and applicable environmental, safety, and health standards while reducing storage and infrastructure costs.

- Storage Pending Disposition—provide storage that meets the Stored Weapons Standard for inventories of weapons-usable plutonium and HEU<sup>4</sup> that have been or may be declared surplus.

- Disposition—convert surplus plutonium and plutonium that may be declared surplus in the future to forms that meet the Spent Fuel Standard,<sup>5</sup> thereby providing evidence of irreversible disarmament and setting a model for proliferation resistance.

### 2. Long-Term Storage Alternatives and Related Activities

a. *No Action.* Under the No Action Alternative, all weapons-usable fissile materials would remain at existing storage sites. Maintenance at existing storage facilities would be done as required to ensure safe operation for the balance of the facility's useful life. Sites covered under the No Action Alternative included Hanford, INEL, Pantex, the ORR, SRS, RFETS, and LANL. Although there are no weapons-usable fissile materials within the scope of the S&D PEIS stored currently at Nevada Test Site (NTS), it was also analyzed under No Action to provide an environmental baseline against which impacts of the storage and disposition action alternatives were analyzed.

b. *Upgrade at Multiple Sites.* Under this alternative for storage, DOE would either modify certain existing facilities or build new facilities, depending on the site's ability to meet standards for nuclear material storage facilities, and would utilize existing site infrastructure to the extent possible. These modified or new facilities would be designed to operate for up to 50 years. Plutonium

accounting for the storage of intact nuclear weapons should be maintained, to the extent practical, for weapons-usable fissile materials throughout dismantlement, storage, and disposition.

<sup>4</sup>The S&D PEIS covers long-term storage of non-surplus HEU and storage of surplus HEU pending disposition. Until storage decisions are implemented, surplus HEU that has not gone to disposition will continue to be stored pursuant to, and not to exceed the 10-year interim storage time period evaluated in, the Environmental Assessment for the Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium Above the Maximum Historical Storage Level at the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (Y-12 EA) (DOE/EA-0929, September 1994) and Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI).

<sup>5</sup>The "Spent Fuel Standard" for disposition was also initially defined in Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, National Academy of Sciences, 1994. DOE defines the Spent Fuel Standard as follows: The surplus weapons-usable plutonium should be made as inaccessible and unattractive for weapons use as the much larger and growing quantity of plutonium that exists in spent nuclear fuel from commercial power reactors.

materials currently stored at Hanford, INEL, Pantex, and SRS would remain at those four sites (in upgraded or new facilities), and HEU would remain at ORR (in upgraded, consolidated facilities). This alternative does not apply to NTS because NTS does not currently store weapons-usable fissile materials.

A sub-alternative of relocating portions of the plutonium inventory (a total of 14.4 metric tons according to DOE's Openness Initiative announcements of December 7, 1993, and February 6, 1996, respectively) from RFETS and LANL to one or more of the four existing plutonium storage sites is analyzed. Storage of surplus materials without strategic reserve and weapons research and development (R&D) materials is also included as a sub-alternative. Within some of the five candidate storage sites under this alternative, there are also multiple storage options.

c. *Consolidation of Plutonium.* Under this alternative, plutonium materials at existing sites would be removed, and the entire DOE inventory of plutonium would be consolidated at one site, while the HEU inventory would remain at ORR. Again, Hanford, INEL, Pantex and SRS would be candidate sites for plutonium consolidation. In addition, NTS would be a candidate site for this alternative. Consolidation of plutonium at ORR would result in a situation in which inventories of plutonium and HEU were collocated at one site; this alternative was therefore analyzed as one option under the Collocation Alternative (see below). A sub-alternative to account for the separate storage of surplus materials without strategic reserve and weapons R&D materials was also included.

d. *Collocation of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium.* Under the Collocation Alternative, the entire DOE inventory of plutonium and HEU would be consolidated and collocated at the same site. The six candidate sites would be Hanford, NTS, INEL, Pantex, ORR, and SRS. A sub-alternative for the separate storage of surplus materials without strategic reserve and weapons R&D materials was also included.

### 3. Plutonium Disposition Alternatives and Related Activities

The disposition technologies analyzed in the S&D PEIS were those that would convert surplus plutonium into a form that would meet the Spent Fuel Standard. For the purpose of environmental impact analyses of the various disposition alternatives, both generic and specific sites were used to provide perspective on these



alternatives. Under each alternative, there are various ways to implement the alternative. These “variants” (such as the can-in-canister<sup>6</sup> approach) are shown in Table 1 to provide a range of available options for consideration.

TABLE 1.—DESCRIPTION OF VARIANTS UNDER PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION ALTERNATIVES

Alternatives analyzed	Possible variants
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Deep Borehole Direct Disposition</li> <li>• Deep Borehole Immobilized Disposition</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Arrangement of plutonium in different types of emplacement canisters.</li> <li>• Emplacement of pellet-group mix.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• New Vitrification Facilities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Pumped emplacement of pellet-grout mix.</li> <li>• Plutonium concentration loading, size and shape of ceramic pellets.</li> <li>• Collocated pit disassembly/conversion, plutonium conversion, and immobilization facilities.</li> <li>• Use of either Cs-137 from capsules or HLW as a radiation barrier.</li> <li>• Wet or dry feed preparation technologies.</li> <li>• An adjunct melter adjacent to the DWPF at SRS, in which borosilicate glass frit with plutonium (without highly radioactive radionuclides) is added to borosilicate glass containing HLW from the DWPF.</li> <li>• A can-in-canister approach at SRS in which cans of plutonium glass (without highly radioactive radionuclides) are placed in DWPF canisters which are then filled with borosilicate glass containing HLW in the DWPF (see Appendix O of the Final PEIS).</li> <li>• A can-in-canister approach similar to above but using new facilities at sites other than SRS.</li> <li>• Collocated pit disassembly/plutonium conversion, and immobilization facilities.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• New Ceramic Immobilization Facilities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use of either Cs-137 from capsules or HLW as a radiation barrier.</li> <li>• Wet or dry feed preparation technologies.</li> <li>• A can-in-canister approach at SRS in which the plutonium is immobilized without highly radioactive radionuclides in a ceramic matrix and then placed in the DWPF canisters that are then filled with borosilicate glass containing HLW (See Appendix O of the Final PEIS).</li> <li>• A can-in-canister approach similar to above but using new facilities at sites other than SRS.</li> <li>• Immobilize plutonium into metal ingot form.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Electrometallurgical Treatment (glass-bonded zeolite form)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Locate at DOE sites other than ANL-W at INEL.</li> <li>• Pressurized or Boiling Water Reactors.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Existing LWR With New MOX Facilities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Different numbers of reactors.</li> <li>• European MOX fuel fabrication.</li> <li>• Modification/completion of existing facilities for MOX fabrication.</li> <li>• Collocated pit disassembly/conversion, plutonium conversion, and MOX facilities.</li> <li>• Reactors with different core management schemes (plutonium loadings, refueling intervals).</li> <li>• Same as for existing LWR (except that MOX fuel would not be fabricated in Europe).</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Partially Completed LWR With New MOX Facilities</li> <li>• Evolutionary LWR With New MOX Facilities</li> <li>• Existing CANDU Reactor With New MOX Facilities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Same as for partially completed LWR.</li> <li>• Different numbers of reactors.</li> <li>• Modification/completion of existing facilities for MOX fabrication.</li> <li>• Collocated pit disassembly/conversion, plutonium conversion, and MOX facilities.</li> <li>• Reactors with different core management schemes (plutonium loadings, refueling intervals).</li> </ul>

Note: ANL-W=Argonne National Laboratory-West; Cs-137=cesium-137; HLW=high-level waste; LWR=light water reactor

The first step in plutonium disposition is to remove the surplus plutonium from storage, then process this material in a pit disassembly/conversion facility (for pits) or in a plutonium conversion facility (for non-pit materials). The processing would convert the plutonium material into a form suitable for each of the disposition alternatives described in the following sections. The pit disassembly/conversion facility and the plutonium conversion facility would be built at a DOE site. The six candidate sites for long-term storage were evaluated for the potential environmental impacts of constructing and operating these facilities.

*a. No Disposition Action.* A “No Plutonium Disposition” action means disposition would not occur, and surplus plutonium-bearing weapon components (pits) and other forms, such as metal and oxide, would remain in storage in accordance with decisions on the long-term storage of weapons-usable fissile materials.

*b. Deep Borehole Category.* Under this category of alternatives, surplus weapons-usable plutonium would be disposed of in deep boreholes that would be drilled at least 4 kilometers (km) (2.5 miles [mi]) into ancient, geologically stable rock formations beneath the water table. The deep borehole would provide a geologic

barrier against potential proliferation. A generic site was evaluated for the construction and operation of a borehole complex where the surplus plutonium would be prepared for emplacement in the borehole. This complex would consist of five major facilities: Processing; drilling; emplacing/sealing; waste management; and support (security, maintenance, and utilities).

(1) Direct Disposition (Borehole). Under the Direct Disposition Alternative, surplus plutonium would be removed from storage, processed as necessary, converted to a form suitable for emplacement, packaged, and placed in a deep borehole. The deep borehole would be sealed to isolate the

<sup>6</sup>In the can-in-canister variant, cans of plutonium in a glass or ceramic matrix would be placed in a canister. This canister would then be filled with

borosilicate glass containing high-level radioactive waste (HLW) or highly radioactive material such as cesium. This variant, at an existing facility (the

Defense Waste Processing Facility [DWPF] at SRS), is described in Appendix O of the S&D Final PEIS.

plutonium from the accessible environment. Long-term performance of the deep borehole would depend on the stability of the geologic system. A generic site was used for the borehole complex to analyze the environmental impact of this alternative.

(2) *Immobilized Disposition (Borehole).* Under the Immobilized Disposition Alternative, the surplus plutonium would be removed from storage, processed, and converted to a suitable form for shipment to a ceramic immobilization facility. The output of this facility would be spherical ceramic pellets containing plutonium, facilitating handling during transportation and emplacement. The ceramic pellets (about 2.54 centimeters [cm] [1 inch {in}] in diameter and containing 1 percent plutonium by weight) would then be placed in drums and shipped to the borehole complex. At the deep borehole site, the ceramic pellets would be mixed with non-plutonium ceramic pellets and fixed with grout during emplacement. The deep borehole would be sealed to isolate the plutonium from the accessible environment. Long-term performance of the deep borehole would depend on the stability of the geologic system.

Although a generic site was used for analyses of the borehole complex in this alternative, the ceramic immobilization facility would be built at a DOE site. Therefore, the six candidate sites for long-term storage were used to evaluate the environmental impacts of the borehole immobilization facility.

*c. Immobilization Category.* Under this category of alternatives, surplus plutonium would be immobilized to create a chemically stable form for disposal in a geologic repository pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA).<sup>7</sup> The plutonium material would be mixed with or surrounded by high-level waste (HLW) or other radioactive isotopes and immobilized to create a radiation field that could serve as a proliferation deterrent, along with safeguards and security comparable to those of commercial spent nuclear fuel,

thereby achieving the Spent Fuel Standard. All immobilized plutonium would be encased in stainless steel canisters and would remain in onsite vault-type storage until a geologic repository pursuant to the NWPA is operational.

(1) *Vitrification.* Under the Vitrification Alternative, surplus plutonium would be removed from storage, processed, packaged, and transported to the vitrification facility. In this facility, the plutonium would be mixed with glass frit and highly radioactive cesium-137 (Cs-137) or HLW to produce borosilicate glass logs (a slightly different process, using HLW, would be used for the can-in-canister variant, as discussed in Appendix O of the S&D Final PEIS). The Cs-137 isotope could come from the cesium chloride (CsCl) capsules currently stored at Hanford or from existing HLW if the site selected for vitrification already manages HLW. Each glass log produced from the vitrification facility would contain about 84 kilograms (kg) (185 pounds [lb]) of plutonium. The vitrification facility would be built at a DOE site. The six candidate sites for long-term storage were analyzed for this alternative.

(2) *Ceramic Immobilization.* Under the Ceramic Immobilization Alternative, surplus plutonium would be removed from storage, processed, packaged, and transported to a ceramic immobilization facility. In this facility, the plutonium would be mixed with nonradioactive ceramic materials and Cs-137 or HLW to produce ceramic disks (a slightly different process, using HLW, would be used for the can-in-canister variant, as discussed in Appendix O of the S&D Final PEIS). Each disk would be approximately 30 cm (12 in) in diameter and 10 cm (4 in) thick, and would contain approximately 4 kg (9 lb) of plutonium. The Cs-137 or HLW would be provided as previously described. The ceramic immobilization facility would be built at a DOE site. The six candidate sites for long-term storage were analyzed for this alternative.

(3) *Electrometallurgical Treatment.* Under the Electrometallurgical Treatment Alternative, surplus plutonium would be removed from storage, processed, packaged, and transported to new or modified facilities for electrometallurgical treatment. This process could immobilize surplus fissile materials into a glass-bonded zeolite (GBZ) form. With the GBZ material, the plutonium would be in the form of a stable, leach-resistant mineral that is

incorporated in durable glass materials.<sup>8</sup> Existing electrometallurgical facilities at INEL were used as a representative site for analysis of potential environmental impacts.

*d. Reactor Category.* Under the reactor alternatives considered in the S&D PEIS, DOE would fabricate surplus plutonium into MOX fuel for use in reactors. The irradiated MOX fuel would reduce the proliferation risks of the plutonium material, and the reactors would also generate electricity. MOX fuel would be used in a once-through fuel cycle, with no reprocessing or subsequent reuse of spent fuel. The spent nuclear fuel generated by the reactors would then be sent to a geologic repository pursuant to the NWPA.

Because the United States does not have a MOX fuel fabrication facility or capability, a new dedicated MOX fuel fabrication facility would be built at a DOE or commercial site.<sup>9</sup> The surplus plutonium from storage would be processed, converted to plutonium dioxide (PuO<sub>2</sub>), and transferred to the MOX fuel fabrication facility. In this facility, PuO<sub>2</sub> and uranium dioxide (UO<sub>2</sub>) (from existing domestic sources) would be blended and fabricated into MOX pellets, loaded into fuel rods, and assembled into fuel bundles suitable for use in the reactor alternatives under consideration.

(1) *Existing Light Water Reactors.* Under the Existing Light Water Reactor (LWR) Alternative, the MOX fuel containing surplus plutonium would be fabricated and transported to existing commercial LWRs in the United States, where the MOX fuel would be used instead of conventional UO<sub>2</sub> fuel. The LWRs employed for domestic electric power generation are pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and boiling water reactors (BWRs). Both types of reactors use the heat produced from nuclear fission reactions to generate steam that drives turbines and generates electricity. Three to five reactor units would be needed.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup>In May 1996, the Department issued a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) (61 Fed. Reg. 25647) and decision to proceed with the limited demonstration of the electrometallurgical treatment process at Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-W) at INEL for processing up to 125 spent fuel assemblies from the Experimental Breeder Reactor II (100 drivers and 25 blanket assemblies). Although this alternative could be conducted at other DOE sites, ANL-W is described in the S&D PEIS as the representative site for analysis.

<sup>9</sup>Although a generic commercial site was evaluated in the S&D PEIS, it is not part of the Preferred Alternative or the decisions in this ROD.

<sup>10</sup>It is possible that an existing LWR can be configured to produce tritium, consume plutonium as fuel, and generate revenue through the production of electricity. This configuration is called a multipurpose reactor. Environmental

<sup>7</sup>Also referred to as a permanent, or HLW repository. Pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, DOE is currently characterizing the Yucca Mountain Site in Nevada as a potential repository for spent nuclear fuel and HLW. Legislative clarification, or a determination by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that the immobilized plutonium should be isolated as HLW, may be required before the material could be placed in Yucca Mountain should DOE and the President recommend, and Congress approve, its operation. No Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) wastes would be immobilized unless the immobilization would constitute adequate treatment under RCRA. The immobilized product would be consistent with the repository's waste acceptance criteria.

(2) Partially Completed Light Water Reactors. Under the Partially Completed LWR Alternative, commercial LWRs on which construction has been halted would be completed. The completed reactors would use MOX fuel containing surplus plutonium. The characteristics of these LWRs would be the same as those of the existing LWRs discussed in the Existing LWR Alternative. The Bellefonte Nuclear Plant located along the west bank of the Tennessee River in Alabama was used as a representative site for the environmental analysis of this alternative. Two reactor units (such as those at the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant) would be needed to implement this alternative.

(3) Evolutionary Light Water Reactors. The evolutionary LWRs are improved versions of existing commercial LWRs. Two design approaches were considered in the S&D PEIS. The first is a large PWR or BWR similar to the size of the existing PWR and BWR. The second is a small PWR approximately one-half the size of the large PWR. Two large or four small evolutionary LWRs would be needed to implement this alternative.

Under each design approach for this alternative, evolutionary LWRs would be built at a DOE site. Therefore, the six candidate sites for long-term storage were used to evaluate the environmental impacts of this alternative.

(4) Canadian Deuterium Uranium Reactor. Under the CANDU Reactor Alternative, the MOX fuel containing surplus plutonium would be fabricated in a U.S. facility, then transported for use in one or more commercial heavy water reactors in Canada. The Ontario Hydro Bruce-A Nuclear Generating Station identified by the Government of Canada was used as a representative site for evaluation of this alternative. This station is located on Lake Huron about 300 km (186 mi) northeast of Detroit, Michigan. Environmental analysis of domestic activities up to the U.S./Canadian border is presented in the S&D PEIS. The use of CANDU reactors would be subject to the policies, regulations, and approval of the Federal and Provincial Canadian Governments. Pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic

analysis of the multipurpose reactor is included in Chapter 4 of the Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Tritium Supply and Recycling (TSR PEIS) (DOE/EIS-0161, October 1995) and Appendix N of the S&D PEIS. In the TSR PEIS ROD (December 1995), the multipurpose reactor was preserved as an option for future consideration. The Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) at Hanford has been under consideration for tritium production, and could also use surplus plutonium as reactor fuel if it were shown to be useful for tritium production. This ROD does not preclude use of the FFTF for tritium production or the potential use of surplus plutonium as fuel for the FFTF.

Energy Act, any export of MOX fuel from the United States to Canada must be made under the agreement for cooperation between the two countries. Spent fuel generated by a CANDU reactor would be disposed under the Canadian spent fuel program.

#### C. Preferred Alternative

The S&D Final PEIS presented the Department's Preferred Alternative for both storage and disposition. DOE has decided to implement the Preferred Alternative as described in the S&D Final PEIS. Thus, the Preferred Alternative is described in Section V of this ROD, Decisions.

#### D. Environmental Impacts

Chapter 4 and the appendices of the S&D Final PEIS analyzed the potential environmental impacts of the storage and disposition alternatives in detail. The S&D Final PEIS also evaluated the maximum site impacts that would result at Hanford, INEL, Pantex, and SRS from combining the Preferred Alternative for storage with the Preferred Alternative for disposition. Consistent with the Preferred Alternative, Hanford, INEL, Pantex, and SRS are each a possible location for all or some plutonium disposition activities. The siting, construction, and operation of disposition facilities will be covered in a separate, follow-on EIS. The S&D Final PEIS described the total life cycle impacts that would result from the Preferred Alternative at the DOE sites identified for potential placement of the disposition facilities.

Based on analyses in the S&D Final PEIS, the areas where impacts might be significant are as follows:

- The use of groundwater at the Pantex Plant for storage and disposition facilities could contribute to the overall declining water levels of the Ogallala Aquifer. The projected No Action Alternative water usage at Pantex in the year 2005 reflects a reduction from current usage due to planned downsizing over the next few years. The Preferred Alternative would require a 72-percent increase in the projected No Action Alternative water use; the total amount (428 million liters per year) is considerably less than what is currently being withdrawn (836 million liters per year) at Pantex.

- A set of postulated accidents was used for each plutonium disposition alternative over the life of the campaign to obtain potential radiological impacts at the four DOE sites where disposition facilities could be built. The PEIS analyzes the risk of latent cancer fatalities (reflecting the probability of accident occurrence and the latent

cancer fatalities potentially caused by the accident) for accidents that have low probabilities of occurrence and severe consequences, as well as those that have higher probabilities and low consequences. For potential severe accidents, the risk of latent cancer fatalities to the population located within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the accident for the "front-end" disposition process campaign would range from  $4.5 \times 10^{-16}$  (that is, approximately 1 chance in 2 quadrillion) to  $1.7 \times 10^{-4}$  (approximately 1 chance in 6,000) for the pit disassembly/conversion facility, and from  $1.5 \times 10^{-16}$  to  $1.3 \times 10^{-4}$  for the plutonium conversion facility. This risk would range from  $2.8 \times 10^{-14}$  to  $1.8 \times 10^{-5}$  for the vitrification facility, from  $7.0 \times 10^{-16}$  to  $1.9 \times 10^{-7}$  for the ceramic immobilization facility, and from  $4.6 \times 10^{-16}$  to  $4.3 \times 10^{-4}$  for the MOX fuel fabrication facility. To estimate the change in risk associated with using MOX fuel instead of uranium fuel in existing LWRs, the severe accident scenarios assumed a large population distribution near a generic existing LWR and extreme meteorological conditions for dispersal, leading to large doses that were not necessarily reflective of actual site conditions. The resultant change in risk of cancer fatalities to a generic population located within 80 km (50 mi) of the severe accidents was estimated to range from  $-2.0 \times 10^{-4}$  to  $3.0 \times 10^{-5}$  per year<sup>11</sup>, reflecting a postulated risk of using MOX fuel that ranges from seven percent lower to eight percent higher than the risk of using uranium fuel. Under the Preferred Alternative, the estimated risk of cancer fatalities under severe accident conditions using MOX fuel in existing LWRs ranges from 0.01 to 0.098 for an 11-year campaign.

- Under the Preferred Alternative, HEU would continue to be stored at the Y-12 Plant at ORR in existing facilities that would be upgraded to meet requirements for withstanding natural phenomena, including earthquakes and tornadoes. This upgrade would reduce the expected risk for the design basis accidents analyzed in the Y-12 EA (for example, Building 9212) by approximately 80 percent, resulting in a latent cancer fatality risk of  $7.4 \times 10^{-6}$  (approximately 7 in a million) to the maximally exposed individual,  $5.7 \times 10^{-8}$  (approximately 6 in 100

<sup>11</sup> Accidents severe enough to cause a release of plutonium involved combinations of events that are highly unlikely. Estimates and analyses presented in Chapter 4 and summarized in Table 2.5-3 of the PEIS indicate a range of latent cancer fatalities of 5,900 to 7,300 and a risk of 0.016 to 0.15 of a fatality in the population for the 17-year campaign analyzed under the Existing LWR Alternative.



million) to a non-involved worker, and  $5.1 \times 10^{-7}$  (approximately 5 in 10 million) to the 80-km offsite population.

- Under the Preferred Alternative, safe, secure storage would continue for materials at Hanford, INEL, and ORR, pending disposition. Therefore, there would be no transportation impact at these sites until disposition. The storage transportation impact would come from movement of the RFETS materials to Pantex and SRS. If, following the EIS for construction and operation of plutonium disposition facilities, potential plutonium disposition activities were added to Hanford, INEL, Pantex, and SRS, the estimated total health effects for the life of the project from transportation of surplus plutonium (including transportation of those materials from RFETS to Pantex and SRS) would range from 0.193 fatalities for transportation to Pantex, to 1.87 fatalities for transportation to SRS (primarily from normal expected traffic accidents, not from radiological releases). In addition to the disposition activities at DOE sites, there would be transportation of the MOX fuel from the DOE fuel fabrication site to existing LWRs. The location of the LWRs and the destination of the MOX fuel could be either the eastern or western United States. For 4,000 km (2,486 mi) of such transportation, there could be up to an additional 3.61 potential fatalities (primarily from normal expected traffic accidents, not from radiological releases) for the life of the campaign, assuming 100 percent of the surplus plutonium would be used in commercial reactors. The actual amount would be smaller, and therefore potential fatalities would be lower, under the Preferred Alternative.

- At Hanford, INEL, Pantex, and SRS the Preferred Alternative would slightly increase regional employment and income. At RFETS, phaseout of plutonium storage would result in the loss of approximately 2,200 direct jobs. Compared to the total employment in the area, the loss of these jobs and the impacts to the regional economy would not be severe.

DOE has fully considered all of the environmental analyses in the S&D Final PEIS in reaching the decisions set forth in Section V, below.

#### *E. Avoidance/Minimization of Environmental Harm*

For the long-term storage of fissile material, there are four sites (Hanford, NTS, INEL, and LANL) where the Preferred Alternative is "no action"; that is, no plutonium would be stored at NTS, and at Hanford, INEL, and LANL, DOE would continue storage at

existing facilities, using proven nuclear materials safeguards and security procedures, until disposition. These existing facilities would be maintained to ensure their safe operation and compliance with applicable environmental, safety and health requirements. At RFETS, the Preferred Alternative is to phase out storage of weapons-usable fissile materials, thus mitigating environmental impacts at RFETS. There are three sites (Pantex, ORR, and SRS) where the Preferred Alternative is to upgrade existing and planned new facilities. Site-specific mitigation measures for storage at these sites have been described in the S&D Final PEIS, and are summarized as follows:

- At Pantex, to alleviate the effects from using groundwater from the Ogallala Aquifer, the city of Amarillo is considering supplying treated wastewater to Pantex from the Hollywood Road Wastewater Treatment Plant for industrial use; the Department will use such treated wastewater to the extent possible. Radiation doses to individual workers will be kept low by maintaining comprehensive badged monitoring and programs to keep worker exposures "as low as reasonably achievable" (ALARA).

- At ORR, radiation doses to individual workers will be kept low by maintaining comprehensive badged monitoring and ALARA programs, including worker rotations. Upgrades for HEU storage to meet performance requirements will include seismic structural modifications as documented in Natural Phenomena Upgrade of the Downsized/Consolidated Oak Ridge Uranium/Lithium Plant Facilities. These modifications will reduce the risk of accidents to workers and the public.

- At SRS, to minimize soil erosion impacts during construction, storm water management and erosion control measures will be employed. Mitigation measures for potential Native American resources will be identified through consultation with the potentially affected tribes. Radiation doses to individual workers will be kept low by maintaining comprehensive badged monitoring and ALARA programs including worker rotations. The modified Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility (APSF) will be designed and operated in accordance with contemporary DOE Orders and regulations to reduce risks to workers and the public.

From a nonproliferation standpoint, the highest standards for safeguards and security will be employed during transportation, storage, and disposition.

With respect to transportation, DOE will coordinate the transport of plutonium and HEU with State officials, consistent with current policy. Although the actual routes will be classified, they will be selected to circumvent populated areas, maximize the use of interstate highways, and avoid bad weather. DOE will continue to coordinate emergency preparedness plans and responses with involved states through a liaison program. The packaging, vehicles, and transport procedures being used are specifically designed and tested to prevent a radiological release under all credible accident scenarios.

For the Preferred Alternative for disposition, site-specific mitigation measures will be addressed in the follow-on, site-specific EIS. In the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Storage and Plutonium Disposition Alternatives, measures are proposed to reduce the possibility of the theft or loss of material. For both immobilization and MOX fuel fabrication, bulk processing is the point in the disposition process when the material is most vulnerable to covert attempts to steal or divert it. A variety of opportunities for improving safeguards, some of which are already implemented at large, modern facilities, include near real-time accounting, increased automation in the process design, and improved containment and surveillance.

The security risks posed by transportation can be reduced by minimizing the amount of transportation required (for example, putting the plutonium processing and MOX fabrication operations at the same site), minimizing the number of sites to which material has to be shipped, and minimizing the distance between those sites.

#### *F. Environmentally Preferable Alternatives*

The environmental analyses in Chapter 4 of the S&D Final PEIS indicate that the environmentally preferable alternative (the alternative with the lowest environmental impacts over the 50 years considered in the PEIS) for storage of weapons-usable fissile materials would be the Preferred Alternative, which consists of No Action at Hanford, NTS, INEL, and LANL pending disposition, phaseout of storage at RFETS, and upgrades that would ultimately reduce environmental vulnerabilities at ORR, SRS, and Pantex.

For disposition of surplus plutonium, the environmentally preferable alternative would be the No Disposition Action alternative, because the

plutonium would remain in storage in accordance with decisions on the long-term storage of weapons-usable fissile materials, and there would be no new Federal actions that could impact the environment. For normal operations, analyses show that immobilization would be somewhat preferable to the existing LWR and preferred alternatives, although these alternatives, with the exception of waste generated, would be essentially environmentally comparable.<sup>12</sup>

Severe facility accident considerations indicate that immobilization options would be environmentally preferable to the existing reactor and preferred alternatives, although the likelihood of occurrence of severe accidents and the risk to the public are expected to be fairly low. Although No Disposition Action would be environmentally preferable, it would not satisfy the purpose and need for the Proposed Action, because the stockpile of surplus plutonium would not be reduced, and the Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy would not be implemented.

The hybrid approach (pursuing both reactors/MOX and immobilization) is being chosen over immobilization alone because of the increased flexibility it will provide by ensuring that plutonium disposition can be initiated promptly should one of the approaches ultimately fail or be delayed. Establishing the means for expeditious plutonium disposition will also help provide the basis for an international cooperative effort that can result in reciprocal, irreversible plutonium disposition actions by Russia. (See discussion in sections IV and V, below.)

#### IV. Non-Environmental Considerations

##### A. Technical Summary Reports

To assist in the preparation of this ROD, DOE's Office of Fissile Materials Disposition prepared and in July 1996 issued a *Technical Summary Report for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium Disposition and a Technical Summary Report for Long-Term Storage of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials*. These Technical Summary Reports (TSRs) summarize technical, cost, and schedule data for the storage and disposition alternatives that are considered in the S&D PEIS. After receiving comments on each of the

TSRs, DOE issued revised versions of the reports in October and November, 1996, respectively.

##### 1. Storage Technical Summary Report

This report provides technical, cost and schedule information for long-term storage alternatives analyzed in the S&D PEIS. The cost information for each alternative is presented in constant 1996 dollars and also discounted or present value dollars. It identifies both capital costs and life cycle costs. The following costs are in 1996 dollars.

The cost analyses show that the combination (preferred) alternative for the storage of plutonium would provide advantages to the Department with respect to implementing disposition technologies and would be the least expensive compared to other storage alternatives. The cost of the combination (preferred) alternative would be approximately \$30 million in investment and \$360 million in operating costs from inception until disposition occurs. The cost of the upgrade at multiple sites alternative would be approximately \$380 million in investment and \$3.2 billion in operating costs for 50 years. The costs for the consolidation alternative could range from approximately \$40 million to \$360 million in investment and \$600 million to \$1.1 billion for operating costs for 50 years, depending on the extent to which existing facilities and capabilities can be shared with other programs at the sites.

The schedule analysis shows that the upgraded storage facilities for plutonium under the combination (preferred) alternative could be operational by 2004 at Pantex (Zone 12), and by 2001 at SRS. The upgrade for the storage of HEU could be completed by 2004 (or earlier). RFETS pits could be received at Pantex beginning in 1997 in Zone 4 on a temporary basis until Zone 12 upgrades are completed. The other analyzed alternatives (upgrade and consolidation) would require about six years to complete.

##### 2. Disposition Technical Summary Report

This report provides technical viability, cost, and schedule information for plutonium disposition alternatives and variants analyzed in the S&D PEIS. The variants analyzed in the report are based on pre-conceptual design information in most cases.

a. *Technical Viability Estimates.* The report indicates that each of the alternatives appears to be technically viable, although each is currently at a different level of technical maturity. There is high confidence that the technologies are sufficiently mature to

allow procurement and/or construction of facilities and equipment to meet plutonium disposition technical requirements and to begin disposition in about a decade.<sup>13</sup>

Reactor Alternatives—Light water reactors (LWRs) can be readily converted to enable the use of MOX fuels. Many European LWRs currently operate on MOX fuel cycles. Although some technical risks exist, they are all amenable to engineering resolution. Sufficient existing domestic reactor capacity exists, unless significant delays occur in the disposition mission. CANDU reactors appear to be capable of operating on MOX fuel cycles, but this has never been demonstrated on any industrial scale. Therefore, additional development would be required to achieve the level of maturity for the CANDU reactors that exists for light water reactors. Partially complete and evolutionary LWRs would involve increased technical risk relative to existing LWRs, as well as the need to complete or build (and license) new reactor facilities. The spent MOX fuel waste form that results from reactor disposition of surplus plutonium will have to satisfy waste acceptance criteria for the geologic repository.

Immobilization Alternatives—All vitrification alternatives require additional research and development prior to implementation of immobilization of weapons-usable plutonium. However, a growing experience base exists relating to the vitrification of high-level waste. These existing technologies can be adapted to the plutonium disposition mission, though different equipment designs and glass formulations will generally be necessary due to criticality considerations and chemical differences between plutonium and HLW that may affect the stability of the glass matrix. Vitrification and ceramic immobilization alternatives are similar with regard to the technical maturity of incorporating plutonium in their respective matrices. The technical viability of electrometallurgical treatment has not yet been established for the plutonium disposition mission. The experimental data base for this alternative is limited, and critical questions on waste form performance are not yet resolved. This alternative is considered practical only if the underlying technology is further

<sup>12</sup> The potential risk of latent cancer fatality for a maximally exposed individual of the public from lifetime accident-free operation under the various alternatives are:  $1.2 \times 10^{-9}$  to  $1.2 \times 10^{-7}$  for boreholes,  $1.2 \times 10^{-9}$  to  $1.2 \times 10^{-7}$  for immobilization (vitrification or ceramic immobilization),  $1.3 \times 10^{-6}$  to  $2.6 \times 10^{-6}$  for existing LWRs, and  $9.0 \times 10^{-7}$  to  $1.7 \times 10^{-6}$  for the Preferred Alternative.

<sup>13</sup> Actual timing would depend on technical demonstrations, follow-on site-specific environmental review, detailed cost estimates, and international agreements.



developed for spent nuclear fuels.<sup>14</sup> All of the immobilization alternatives will require qualification (to meet acceptance criteria) of the waste form for the geologic repository, and may require legislative clarification or NRC rulemaking.

**Deep Borehole Alternatives—**Uncertainties for the deep borehole alternatives relate to selecting and qualifying a site; additional legislation and regulations, or legislative and regulatory clarification, may be required. The front-end feed processing operations for the deep borehole alternatives are much simpler than for other alternatives because no highly radioactive materials are processed, thus avoiding the need for remote handling operations. Emplacement technologies are comprised of largely low-technology operations which would be adaptations from existing hardware and processes used in the oil and gas industry.

**Hybrid Approaches—**Two hybrid approaches that combine technologies were considered as illustrative examples, using existing LWR or CANDU reactors in conjunction with a can-in-canister (immobilization) approach. Hybrids provide insurance against technical or institutional hurdles which could arise for a single technology approach for disposition. If any significant roadblock is encountered in any one area of a hybrid, it would be possible to simply divert the feed material to the more viable technology. In the case of a single technology, such roadblocks would be more problematic.

b. **Cost Estimates.** The following discussion is in constant 1996 dollars unless otherwise stated.

(1) **Investment Costs.**

- The investment costs for existing reactor variants tends to be about \$1 billion; completing or building new reactors increases the investment cost to between \$2 billion and \$6 billion.

- The investment cost for the immobilization alternatives ranges from approximately \$0.6 billion for the can-in-canister variants to approximately \$2 billion for new greenfield variants.<sup>15</sup>

- Hybrid alternatives (combining both immobilization and reactor alternatives) require approximately \$200 million additional investment over the existing

light water reactor stand-alone alternatives.

- Investment costs for the deep borehole alternatives range from about \$1.1 billion for direct emplacement to about \$1.4 billion for immobilized emplacement.

- Alternatives that utilize existing facilities for plutonium processing, immobilization, or fuel fabrication would realize significant investment cost savings over building new facilities for the same function.

- Large uncertainties in the cost estimates exist, relating to both engineering and institutional factors.

- A significant fraction of the investment cost for an alternative/variant is related to the front-end facilities for the extraction of the plutonium from pits and other plutonium-bearing materials and for other functions that are common to all alternatives.

(2) **Life Cycle Costs.**

- The life cycle costs for hybrid alternatives are similar to the stand-alone reactor alternatives. For the existing LWR/immobilization hybrid alternative (preferred alternative), the cost is \$260 million higher than the stand-alone reactor alternative; for the CANDU/immobilization hybrid alternative, the cost is \$70 million higher.

- The combined investment and net operating costs for MOX fuel are higher than for commercial uranium fuel; thus, the cost of MOX fuel cannot compete economically with low-enriched uranium fuel for LWRs or natural uranium fuel for CANDU reactors.

- The can-in-canister approaches are the most attractive variants for immobilization based on cost considerations.

- The deep borehole alternatives are more expensive than the can-in-canister and existing reactor alternatives. The immobilized borehole alternative life cycle cost is \$1 billion greater than that for the direct emplacement alternative (\$3.6 billion vs. \$2.6 billion).

- Large uncertainties in the cost estimates exist, relating to engineering, regulatory, and policy considerations.

c. **Schedule Estimates.** The key conclusions of the Disposition Technical Summary Report with respect to schedules are as follows:

- Significant schedule uncertainties exist, relating to both engineering and institutional factors.

- Opportunities for compressing or expanding schedules exist.

(1) **Reactor Alternatives.** • The rate at which MOX fuel is consumed in reactors will depend on the rate that MOX fuel is provided and fabricated,

and the rate that plutonium oxide is provided to the MOX fuel fabrication facility.

- The time to attain production scale operation in existing LWRs and CANDU reactors could be about 8–12 years, depending on the need for and source of test assemblies that might be required.

- The time to complete the disposition mission is a function of the number of reactors committed to the mission, among other factors. For the variants considered, the time to complete varies from about 24 to 31 years.

(2) **Immobilization Alternatives.**

- The time to start the disposition mission ranges from 7 to 13 years, depending on the technology used and whether existing facilities are used.

- The operating campaign for the immobilization alternatives at full-scale operation would be about 10 years; it is possible to compress or expand the operating schedule by several years, if desired, by resizing the immobilization facility designs selected for analysis in this study. The overall mission duration (including research and development, construction, and operation) is expected to be about 18 to 24 years.

- Potential delays for start-up of the immobilization alternatives involve completing process development and demonstration, and qualifying the waste form for a geologic repository.

(3) **Deep Borehole Alternatives.** • The time to start-up is expected to be 10 years.

- The operating duration of the mission would be about 10 years, although completing all burial operations at the borehole site in 3 years is possible. Therefore, the overall mission duration is estimated to be 20 years with accelerated emplacement reducing the duration by about 7 years.

- The schedule for the deep borehole alternatives would depend in part on selecting and qualifying a site, and obtaining legislative and regulatory clarification as well as any necessary permits.

(4) **Hybrid Approaches.** • In general, the schedule data that apply to the component technologies apply to the hybrid alternatives as well.

- Confidence in an early start-up and an earlier completion can both be improved with a hybrid approach, relative to stand-alone alternatives.

- Hybrid alternatives provide an inherent back-up technology approach to enhance confidence in attaining schedule goals.

<sup>14</sup> A recent study by the National Research Council concludes that the electrometallurgical treatment technology is not sufficiently mature to provide a reliable basis for timely plutonium disposition. "An Evaluation of the Electrometallurgical Approach for Treatment of Excess Weapons Plutonium" (National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1996).

<sup>15</sup> "Greenfield" means a variant involving a new facility, with no existing plutonium-handling infrastructure.

*B. Nonproliferation Assessment*

To assist in the development of this ROD, DOE's Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, with support from the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, prepared a report, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Storage and Plutonium Disposition Alternatives. The report was issued in draft form in October 1996, and following a public comment period, was issued in final form in January 1997. It analyzes the nonproliferation and arms reduction implications of the alternatives for storage of plutonium and HEU, and disposition of excess plutonium. It is based in part on a Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team Report prepared for the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition by Sandia National Laboratory. The assessment describes the benefits and risks associated with each option. Some of the "options" and "alternatives" discussed in the Nonproliferation Assessment are listed as "variants" (such as can-in-canister) in the S&D Final PEIS. The key conclusions of the report, as presented in its Executive Summary, are reproduced below.

1. Storage. • Each of the options under consideration for storage of U.S. weapons-usable fissile materials has the potential to support U.S. nonproliferation and arms reduction goals, if implemented appropriately.

• Each of the storage options could provide high levels of security to prevent theft of nuclear materials, and could provide access to excess materials for international monitoring.

• Making excess plutonium and HEU available for bilateral U.S.-Russian monitoring and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, while protecting proliferation-sensitive information, would help demonstrate the U.S. commitment never to return this material to nuclear weapons, providing substantial arms reduction and nonproliferation benefits in the near-term.

2. Disposition of U.S. Excess Plutonium

*a. In General.* • Each of the options for disposition of excess weapons plutonium that meets the Spent Fuel Standard would, if implemented appropriately, offer major nonproliferation and arms reduction benefits compared to leaving the material in storage in directly weapons-usable form. Taking into account the likely impact on Russian disposition activities, the no-action alternative appears to be by far the least desirable of the plutonium disposition options

from a nonproliferation and arms reduction perspective.

• Carrying out disposition of excess U.S. weapons plutonium, using options that ensured effective nonproliferation controls and resulted in forms meeting the Spent Fuel Standard, would:

• reduce the likelihood that current arms reductions would be reversed, by significantly increasing the difficulty, cost, and observability of returning this plutonium to weapons;

• increase international confidence in the arms reduction process, strengthening political support for the nonproliferation regime and providing a base for additional arms reductions, if desired;

• reduce long-term proliferation risks posed by this material by further helping to ensure that weapons-usable material does not fall into the hands of rogue states or terrorist groups; and

• lay the essential foundation for parallel disposition of excess Russian plutonium, reducing the risks that Russia might threaten U.S. security by rebuilding its Cold War nuclear weapons arsenal, or that this material might be stolen for use by potential proliferators.

• Choosing the "no-action alternative" of leaving U.S. excess plutonium in storage in weapons-usable form indefinitely, rather than carrying out disposition:

• would represent a clear reversal of the U.S. position seeking to reduce excess stockpiles of weapons-usable materials worldwide;

• would make it impossible to achieve disposition of Russian excess plutonium;

• could undermine international political support for nonproliferation efforts by leaving open the question of whether the United States was maintaining an option for rapid reversal of current arms reductions; and

• could undermine progress in nuclear arms reductions.

• The benefits of placing U.S. excess plutonium under international monitoring and then transforming it into forms that met the Spent Fuel Standard would be greatly increased, and the risks of these steps significantly decreased, if Russia took comparable steps with its own excess plutonium on a parallel track. The two countries need not use the same plutonium disposition technologies, however.

• As the 1994 NAS committee report<sup>16</sup> concluded, options for disposition of U.S. excess weapons plutonium will provide maximum

nonproliferation and arms control benefits if they:

• minimize the time during which the excess plutonium is stored in forms readily usable for nuclear weapons;

• preserve material safeguards and security during the disposition process, seeking to maintain to the extent possible the same high standards of security and accounting applied to stored nuclear weapons (the Stored Weapons Standard);

• result in a form from which the plutonium would be as inaccessible and unattractive for weapons use as the larger and growing quantity of plutonium in commercial spent fuel (the Spent Fuel Standard).

• In order to achieve the benefits of plutonium disposition as rapidly as possible, and to minimize the risks and negative signals resulting from leaving the excess plutonium in storage, it is important for disposition options to begin, and to complete the mission as soon as practicable taking into account nonproliferation, environment, safety, and health, and economic constraints. Timing should be a key criterion in judging disposition options. Beginning the disposition quickly is particularly important to establishing the credibility of the process, domestically and internationally.

• Each of the options under consideration for plutonium disposition has its own advantages and disadvantages with respect to nonproliferation and arms control, but none is clearly superior to the others.

• Each of the options under consideration for plutonium disposition can potentially provide high levels of security and safeguards for nuclear materials during the disposition process, mitigating the risk of theft of nuclear materials.

• Each of the options under consideration for plutonium disposition can potentially provide for effective international monitoring of the disposition process.

• Plutonium disposition can only reduce, not eliminate, the security risks posed by the existence of excess plutonium, and will involve some risks of its own:

• Because all plutonium disposition options would take decades to complete, disposition is not a near-term solution to the problem of nuclear theft and smuggling. While disposition will make a long-term contribution, the near-term problem must be addressed through programs to improve security and safeguarding for nuclear materials, and to ensure adequate police, customs, and intelligence capabilities to interdict nuclear smuggling.

<sup>16</sup> See footnote 3, above.

- All plutonium disposition options under consideration would involve processing and transport of plutonium, which will involve more risk of theft in the short term than if the material had remained in heavily guarded storage, in return for the long-term benefit of converting the material to more proliferation-resistant forms.

- Both the United States and Russia will still retain substantial stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable fissile materials even after disposition of the fissile materials currently considered excess is complete. These weapons and materials will continue to pose a security challenge regardless of what is done with excess plutonium.

- None of the disposition options under consideration would make it impossible to recover the plutonium for use in nuclear weapons, or make it impossible to use other plutonium to rebuild a nuclear arsenal. Therefore, disposition will only reduce, not eliminate, the risk of reversal of current nuclear arms reductions.

- A U.S. decision to choose reactor alternatives for plutonium disposition could offer additional arguments and justifications to those advocating plutonium reprocessing and recycle in other countries. This could increase the proliferation risk if it in fact led to significant additional separation and handling of weapons-usable plutonium. On the other hand, if appropriately implemented, plutonium disposition might also offer an opportunity to develop improved procedures and technologies for protecting and safeguarding plutonium, which could reduce proliferation risks and would strengthen U.S. efforts to reduce the stockpiles of separated plutonium in other countries.

- Large-scale bulk processing of plutonium, including processes to convert plutonium pits to oxide and prepare other forms for disposition, as well as fuel fabrication or immobilization processes, represents the stage of the disposition process when material is most vulnerable to covert theft by insiders or covert diversion by the host state. Such bulk processing is required for all options, however; in particular, initial processing of plutonium pits and other forms is among the most proliferation-sensitive stages of the disposition process, but is largely common to all the options. More information about the specific process designs is needed to determine whether there are significant differences between the various immobilization and reactor options in the overall difficulty of providing effective assurance against theft or

diversion during the different types of bulk processing involved, and if so, which approach is superior in this respect.

- Transport of plutonium is the point in the disposition process when the material is most vulnerable to overt armed attacks designed to steal plutonium. With sufficient resources devoted to security, however, high levels of protection against such overt attacks can be provided. International, and particularly overseas, shipments would involve greater transportation concerns than domestic shipments.<sup>17</sup>

*b. Conclusions Relating to Specific Disposition Options.*

- The reactor options, homogeneous immobilization<sup>18</sup> options, and deep borehole immobilized emplacement option can all meet the Spent Fuel Standard. The can-in-canister options are being refined to increase the resistance to separation of the plutonium cans from the surrounding glass, with the goal of meeting the Spent Fuel Standard. The deep borehole direct emplacement option substantially exceeds the Spent Fuel Standard with respect to recovery by sub-national groups, but could be more accessible and attractive for recovery by the host state than spent fuel.

- The reactor options have some advantage over the immobilization options with respect to perceived irreversibility, in that the plutonium would be converted from weapons-grade to reactor-grade, even though it is possible to produce nuclear weapons with both weapons and reactor-grade plutonium. The immobilization and deep borehole options have some advantage over the reactor options in avoiding the perception that they could potentially encourage additional separation and civilian use of plutonium, which itself poses proliferation risks.

- Options that result in accountable "items" (for purposes of international safeguards) whose plutonium content can be accurately measured (such as

fuel assemblies or immobilized cans without fission products in the "can-in-canister" option) offer some advantage in accounting to ensure that the output plutonium matches the input plutonium from the process. Other options (such as homogeneous immobilization or immobilized emplacement in deep boreholes) would require greater reliance on containment and surveillance to provide assurance that no material was stolen or diverted—but in some cases could involve simpler processing, easing the task of providing such assurance.

- The principal uncertainty with respect to using excess weapons plutonium as MOX in U.S. LWRs relates to the potential difficulty of gaining political and regulatory approvals for the various operations required.

- Compared to the LWR option, the CANDU option would involve more transport and more safeguarding issues at the reactor sites themselves (because of the small size of the CANDU fuel bundles and the on-line refueling of the CANDU reactors). Demonstrating the use of MOX in CANDU reactors by carrying out this option for excess weapons plutonium disposition could somewhat detract from U.S. efforts to convince nations operating CANDU reactors in regions of proliferation concern not to pursue MOX fuel cycles, but these nations are likely to base their fuel cycle decisions primarily on factors independent of disposition of this material. Disposing of excess weapons plutonium in another country long identified with disarmament could have significant symbolic advantages, particularly if carried out in parallel with Russia. Disposition of Russian plutonium in CANDU reactors, however, would require resolving additional transportation issues and additional questions relating to the likely Russian desire for compensation for the energy value of the plutonium.

- The immobilization options have the potential to be implemented more quickly than the reactor options. They face somewhat less political uncertainty but somewhat more technical uncertainty than the reactor options.

- The likelihood of very long delays in gaining approval for siting and construction of deep borehole sites represents a very serious arms reduction and nonproliferation disadvantage of the borehole option, in either of its variants. While the deep borehole direct-emplacement option requires substantially less bulk processing than the other disposition options, that option may not meet the Spent Fuel Standard for retrievability by the host state, as mentioned above. Any potential

<sup>17</sup> International shipments would be involved (from the United States to Canada) if the CANDU option were pursued as a result of international agreements among the U.S., Canada, and Russia. Overseas shipments would be involved if European MOX fuel fabrication were utilized in the interim before a domestic MOX fabrication facility were completed. The Preferred Alternative and the decisions in this ROD do not involve European MOX fuel fabrication.

<sup>18</sup> The term "homogeneous immobilization" refers to mixing of solutions of plutonium and either HLW or cesium in liquid form, followed by solidification of the mixture in either glass or ceramic matrices. This contrasts with the "can-in-canister" variant, in which the plutonium and HLW or cesium materials are never actually mixed together.



advantage from the reduced processing is small compared to the large timing uncertainty and the potential retrievability disadvantage.

- Similarly, the electrometallurgical treatment option, because it is less developed than the other immobilization options, involves more uncertainty in when it could be implemented, which represents a significant arms reduction and nonproliferation disadvantage. It does not appear to have major compensating advantages compared to the other immobilization options.

- The “can-in-canister” immobilization options have a timing advantage over the homogeneous immobilization options, in that, by potentially relying on existing facilities, they could begin several years sooner. As noted above, however, modified systems intended to allow this option to meet the Spent Fuel Standard are still being designed.

### C. Comments on the S&D Final PEIS

After issuing the Final PEIS, DOE received approximately 100 letters from organizations and individuals commenting on the alternatives addressed in the PEIS. Many of these letters expressed opposition to the MOX fuel approach for surplus plutonium disposition. The major concern raised in these letters was the contention that the use of MOX fuel is associated with proliferation risk as well as additional delays, costs, and safety and environmental risks. One of these letters was from a coalition of 14 national organizations recommending that the Department decide to utilize immobilization for the disposition of all surplus plutonium and that MOX be retained for use, if at all, only as an “insurance policy” if immobilization should prove infeasible. Several of those 14 organizations also wrote separately making similar points. Conversely, many of the letters provided comments in support of the use of MOX fuel and/or a dual path, while a few expressed opposition to the immobilization alternatives.

Seven of the letters received suggested the use of disposition approaches that were not analyzed in the PEIS. Three of these approaches (dropping plutonium into volcanoes, burying it in the sea at the base of a volcano, and storing it in large granite or marble structures) are similar to options that were either considered (but found to be unreasonable) in a screening process that preceded the PEIS, or were addressed in the PEIS Comment Response Document. These approaches were considered to be potentially

damaging to the environment, among other things, and were therefore dismissed as unreasonable. Three other alternatives (plasma technology, binding and neutralizing plutonium with a new organic material, and use in rocket engines) recommended in these letters would require a substantial amount of development and could not be accomplished in the same time frame as alternatives analyzed in the PEIS. One commentator suggested adding the plutonium to the radioactive sludge being stored at Hanford for eventual disposal. The Department views this as unreasonable because of delays and increased costs that would be incurred in the program to manage the wastes in the Hanford tanks. One commentator was opposed to the utilization of Hanford’s Fuels and Materials Examination Facility for MOX fuel fabrication and the Fast Flux Test Facility for MOX fuel burning.

All of the issues raised in these letters are covered in the body of the Final PEIS, in the Comment Response Document, the Summary Report of the Screening Process (DOE/MD-0002, March 19, 1995), the Technical Summary Report for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium Disposition, or the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Storage and Plutonium Disposition Alternatives, which have each been considered in reaching this ROD.

The Department’s decision for surplus plutonium disposition is to pursue both the existing LWR (MOX fuel) and immobilization approaches. DOE recognizes that the estimated life-cycle cost of immobilization alone would be less than that of the hybrid approach (pursuing both), but the additional expense would be warranted by the increased flexibility should one of the approaches ultimately fail, and the increased ability to influence Russian plutonium disposition actions. (The lowest cost approach would be the No Disposition Action alternative; however, as noted in section III.F, above, that option would not satisfy the purpose and need for this program.) DOE also recognizes that analyses in the PEIS indicated that, for normal operation, the environmental and health impacts would be somewhat lower for immobilization, although, with the exception of waste generation, impacts for the preferred, immobilization, and existing LWR (MOX) alternatives would be essentially comparable (see prior discussion).

Potential latent cancer fatalities for members of the public under the MOX approach would be significantly higher

than under the immobilization approach only under highly unlikely facility accident scenarios; the risk (taking into account accident probabilities) to the public of latent cancer fatalities from accidents would be fairly low for both approaches.

From the nonproliferation standpoint, results of the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Storage and Plutonium Disposition Alternatives (see section IV.B) indicated that each of the options under consideration for plutonium disposition has its own advantages and disadvantages, and each can potentially provide high levels of security and safeguards for nuclear materials during the disposition process, mitigating the risk of theft of nuclear materials. Initial processing of plutonium pits and other forms is among the most proliferation-sensitive stages of the disposition process, but is largely common to all the options. Although the Assessment also concluded that none of the approaches is clearly superior to the others, both the Nonproliferation Assessment and a letter from the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Task Force on the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Implications of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Disposition Alternatives (included as Appendix B to the Nonproliferation Assessment) concluded that the hybrid approach (both reactors/MOX and immobilization) is preferable because of uncertainties in each approach and because it would minimize potential delays should problems develop with either approach. Numerous comment letters have made similar points.

One such letter was received from five individuals who were the U.S. participants on the U.S.-Russian Independent Scientific Commission on Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium. This letter supported the dual-track approach on the grounds that “ruling out reactors and thus depending solely on vitrification as the only approach to plutonium disposition that might be implementable anytime soon, would have far bigger nonproliferation liabilities than would the two-track approach.” These commentators argued that designating only immobilization as the preferred approach, with MOX as a back-up, would have essentially all the nonproliferation and arms reduction liabilities of a one-track approach, which would weaken the U.S. position and have severe consequences for the likely success of programs to carry out permanent disposition of weapons plutonium in Russia, and therefore jeopardize the success of programs to

carry out U.S. disposition. These commentors stated that without the dual-track approach, the U.S. will lose any leverage it might have over the conditions and safeguards accompanying the use of Russian plutonium in their reactors. They also pointed out that pursuing both the MOX option and immobilization in the U.S. may be the best way to convince Russia, which currently favors converting its own plutonium to MOX fuel, of the value of immobilization for a portion of its excess plutonium. These commentors argued that the dual-track approach would not undermine U.S. nonproliferation policy, would not increase the risk of nuclear theft and terrorism, and would not lead to a new domestic plutonium recycle industry since it would not significantly affect the huge economic barriers to using MOX fuel on a commercial basis.

Two commentors expressed opposition to plutonium recycling (reprocessing), citing the Final Generic Environmental Statement on the Use of Recycle Plutonium in Mixed Oxide Fuel in Light Water Cooled Reactors (GESMO), NUREG-0002, which was issued by the NRC in 1976, and President Carter's decision to ban plutonium recycling. DOE notes that plutonium recycling is not part of the plutonium disposition program or the decisions in this ROD; on the contrary, this ROD includes conditions on the use of MOX fuel that are intended to prevent the use of recycled plutonium.

The use of MOX fuel in existing reactors would be undertaken in a manner that is consistent with the United States' policy objective on the irreversibility of the nuclear disarmament process and the United States' policy discouraging the use of plutonium for civil purposes. To this end, implementing the MOX alternative would include government ownership and control of the MOX fuel fabrication facility at a DOE site, and use of the facility only for the surplus plutonium disposition program. There would be no reprocessing or subsequent reuse of spent MOX fuel. The MOX fuel would be used in a once-through fuel cycle in existing reactors, with appropriate arrangements, including contractual or licensing provisions, limiting use of MOX fuel to surplus plutonium disposition.

One commentor, who opposed MOX fuel use, urged DOE not to use European MOX fuel fabrication capability if the MOX approach is pursued. In this ROD, DOE has not decided to use European MOX fuel fabrication.

## V. Decisions

### A. Storage of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials

Consistent with the Preferred Alternative in the S&D Final PEIS, the Department has decided to reduce, over time, the number of locations where the various forms of plutonium are stored, through a combination of storage alternatives in conjunction with a combination of disposition alternatives. DOE will begin implementing this decision by moving surplus plutonium from RFETS as soon as possible, transporting the pits to Pantex beginning in 1997, and non-pit plutonium materials to SRS upon completion of the expanded Actinide Packing and Storage Facility (APSF), anticipated in 2001. Over time, DOE will store this plutonium in upgraded facilities at Pantex and in the expanded APSF. Surplus and non-surplus HEU will be stored in upgraded facilities at ORR. Storage facilities for the surplus HEU will also be modified, as needed, to accommodate international inspection requirements consistent with the President's Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy. Accordingly, DOE has decided to pursue the following actions for storage:

- Phase out storage of all weapons-usable plutonium at RFETS beginning in 1997; move pits to Pantex, and non-pit materials to SRS upon completion of the expanded APSF. At Pantex, DOE will repackage pits from RFETS in Zone 12, then place them in existing storage facilities in Zone 4, pending completion of facility upgrades in Zone 12. At SRS, DOE will expand the planned new APSF, and move separated and stabilized non-pit plutonium materials from RFETS to the expanded APSF upon completion. The small number of pits currently at RFETS that are not in shippable form will be placed in a shippable condition in accordance with existing procedures prior to shipment to Pantex. Additionally, some pits and non-pit plutonium materials from RFETS could be used at SRS, LANL, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) for tests and demonstrations of aspects of disposition technologies (see disposition decision, below). All non-pit weapons-usable plutonium materials currently stored at RFETS are surplus.

The Department's decision to remove plutonium from RFETS is based on the cleanup agreement among DOE, EPA, and the State of Colorado for RFETS, the proximity of RFETS to the Denver metropolitan area, and the fact that some of the RFETS plutonium is currently stored in buildings 371 and

376, two of the most vulnerable facilities as defined by and identified in DOE's Plutonium Working Group Report on Environmental, Safety, and Health Vulnerabilities Associated With the Department's Plutonium Storage (DOE/EH-0414, November, 1994).

- Upgrade storage facilities at Zone 12 South (to be completed by 2004) at Pantex to store those surplus pits currently stored at Pantex, and surplus pits from RFETS, pending disposition. Storage facilities at Zone 4 will continue to be used for these pits prior to completion of the upgrade.

- In accordance with the preferred alternative in the Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Stockpile Stewardship and Management (Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS), store Strategic Reserve pits at Pantex in other upgraded facilities in Zone 12.

The Department's decision to consolidate pit storage at Pantex places the pits at a central location where most of the pits already reside and where the expertise and infrastructure are already in place to accommodate pit storage.<sup>19</sup> Pantex has more than 40 years of experience with the handling of pits. Zone 12 facilities would be modified for long-term storage of the Pantex plutonium inventory and the small number of pits transferred from RFETS and SRS for a modest cost (about \$10 million capital cost). Pursuant to the Final EIS for the Continued Operation of the Pantex Plant and Associated Storage of Nuclear Weapon Components (DOE/EIS-0225), DOE is proposing to continue nuclear weapons stockpile management operations and related activities at the Pantex Plant, including interim storage of up to 20,000 pits.<sup>20</sup> Consequently, the storage of surplus pits at Pantex would offer the opportunity to share trained people and other resources, and a decreased cost could be realized over other sites without similar experience. Using the Pantex Plant for pit storage would also involve the lowest cost and the least new construction relative to other sites.

- Expand the planned APSF at SRS (Upgrade Alternative) to store those surplus, non-pit plutonium materials currently at SRS and surplus non-pit plutonium materials from RFETS, pending disposition (see disposition decision, below). DOE analyzed the

<sup>19</sup> A small number of research and development pits located at RFETS that have been and will continue to be packaged and returned to LANL and LLNL are outside the scope of the S&D PEIS and this ROD.

<sup>20</sup> The pits that are to be moved to Pantex pursuant to this ROD fall within the 20,000 pit limit.

potential impacts of constructing and operating the APSF in the Final Environmental Impact Statement, Interim Management of Nuclear Materials (DOE/EIS-0220) and announced the decision to build the facility in the associated ROD (60 FR 65300, December 19, 1995). DOE, pursuant to the decisions announced here to store surplus non-pit plutonium at SRS, will likely design and build the APSF and the expanded space to accommodate the RFETS material as one building,<sup>21</sup> which DOE plans to complete in 2001. The RFETS surplus non-pit plutonium materials<sup>22</sup> will be moved to SRS after stabilization is performed at RFETS under corrective actions in response to Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 94-1; and after the material is packaged in DOE-approved storage and shipping containers pursuant to existing procedures. The surplus plutonium already on-site at SRS and the movement of separated and stabilized non-pit plutonium from RFETS would result in the storage of a maximum of 10 metric tons of surplus plutonium in the new, expanded APSF at SRS. In addition, shipment of the non-pit plutonium from RFETS to SRS, after stabilization, would only be implemented if the subsequent ROD for a plutonium disposition site (see Section V.B., below) calls for immobilization of plutonium at SRS. Placement of surplus, non-pit plutonium materials in a new storage facility at SRS will allow utilization of existing expertise and plutonium handling capabilities in a location where disposition activities could occur (see disposition decision, below). The decision to store non-pit plutonium from RFETS at SRS places most non-pit material at a plutonium-competent site with the most modern, state-of-the-art storage and processing facilities, and at a site with the only remaining large-scale chemical separation and processing capability in the DOE

complex.<sup>23</sup> Pits currently located at SRS will be moved to Pantex for storage consistent with the Preferred Alternative in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS. There are no strategic non-pit materials currently located at SRS.

- Continue current storage (No Action) of surplus plutonium at Hanford and INEL, pending disposition (or movement to lag storage<sup>24</sup> at disposition facilities when selected).<sup>25</sup> This action will allow surplus plutonium to remain at the sites with existing expertise and plutonium handling capabilities, and where potential disposition activities could occur (see disposition decision, below). There are no non-surplus weapons-usable plutonium materials currently stored at either site.

- Continue current storage (No Action) of plutonium at LANL, pending disposition (or movement to lag storage at the disposition facilities). This plutonium will be stored in stabilized form with the non-surplus plutonium in the upgraded Nuclear Material Storage Facility pursuant to the No Action alternative for the site.

- Take No Action at the NTS. DOE will not introduce plutonium to sites that do not currently have plutonium in storage.

- Upgrade storage facilities at the Y-12 Plant (Y-12) (to be completed by 2004 or earlier) at ORR to store non-surplus HEU and surplus HEU pending disposition. Existing storage facilities at Y-12 will be modified to meet natural phenomena requirements, as documented in Natural Phenomena Upgrade of the Downsized/Consolidated Oak Ridge Uranium/Lithium Plant Facilities (Y/EN-5080, 1994). Storage facilities will be consolidated, and the storage footprint will be reduced, as surplus HEU is dispositioned and blended to low-enriched uranium, pursuant to the ROD for the Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium Final Environmental Impact Statement (61 FR 40619, August 5, 1996). Consistent with the Preferred

Alternative in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS, HEU strategic reserves will be stored at the Y-12 Plant.

#### *B. Plutonium Disposition*

Consistent with the Preferred Alternative in the S&D Final PEIS, DOE has decided to pursue a strategy for plutonium disposition that allows for immobilization of surplus weapons plutonium in glass or ceramic forms and burning of the surplus plutonium as mixed oxide fuel (MOX) in existing reactors. The decision to pursue disposition of the surplus plutonium using these approaches is supported by the analyses in the Disposition Technical Summary Report (section IV.A.2 above) and the Nonproliferation Assessment (section IV.B above), as well as the S&D Final PEIS. The results of additional technology development and demonstrations, site-specific environmental review, detailed cost proposals, nonproliferation considerations, and negotiations with Russia and other nations will ultimately determine the timing and extent to which MOX as well as immobilization is deployed. These efforts will provide the basis and flexibility for the United States to initiate disposition efforts either multilaterally or bilaterally through negotiations with other nations, or unilaterally as an example to Russia and other nations.

Pursuant to this decision, the United States policy not to encourage the civil use of plutonium and, accordingly, not to itself engage in plutonium reprocessing for either nuclear power or nuclear explosive purposes, does not change. Although under this decision some plutonium may ultimately be burned in existing reactors, extensive measures will be pursued (see below) to ensure that federal support for this unique disposition mission does not encourage other civil uses of plutonium or plutonium reprocessing. The United States will maintain its commitments regarding the use of plutonium in civil nuclear programs in western Europe and Japan.

The Disposition Technical Summary Report (section IV.A.2 above) concluded that the lowest cost option for plutonium disposition would be immobilization using the can-in-canister variant and existing facilities to the maximum extent possible, with a net life-cycle cost of about \$1.8 billion. The Disposition Technical Summary Report also estimated that the net life-cycle cost of the hybrid immobilization/MOX approach would be about \$2.2 billion. The additional expense of pursuing the hybrid approach would be warranted by

<sup>21</sup> Building the APSF in this way, rather than as originally configured plus an expansion, will not increase the potential impacts of constructing and operating the facility beyond those analyzed in the S&D Final PEIS in conjunction with the analyses in the Final Environmental Impact Statement, Interim Management of Nuclear Materials.

<sup>22</sup> This decision does not include residues at RFETS that are less than 50-percent plutonium by weight, or scrub alloys. The management and disposition of those materials has been or is being considered in separate NEPA reviews. See Environmental Assessment for Solid Residue Treatment, Repackaging, and Storage (DOE/EA-1120, April 1996); Notice of Intent to Prepare an EIS on the Management of Certain Plutonium Residues and Scrub Alloy Stored at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (61 FR 58866, November 19, 1996).

<sup>23</sup> SRS is one of the preferred candidate sites for plutonium disposition facilities, including the potential for the early start of disposition by immobilization using the can-in-canister option at the DWPF.

<sup>24</sup> Lag storage is temporary storage at the applicable disposition facility.

<sup>25</sup> Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) currently stores 0.3 metric tons of plutonium, which are primarily research and development and operational feedstock materials not surplus to government needs. Adequate storage facilities for this material currently exist at LLNL, where it will be stored and used for research and development activities. None of the plutonium stored at LLNL falls within the scope of the disposition alternatives in the S&D Final PEIS or the disposition decisions in this ROD.



the increased flexibility it would provide, as noted in the Nonproliferation Assessment, to ensure that plutonium disposition could be initiated promptly should one of the approaches ultimately fail or be delayed. Establishing the means for expeditious plutonium disposition will also help provide the basis for an international cooperative effort that can result in reciprocal, irreversible plutonium disposition actions by Russia. This disposition strategy signals a strong U.S. commitment to reducing its stockpile of surplus plutonium, thereby effectively meeting the purpose of and need for the Proposed Action.

To accomplish the plutonium disposition mission, DOE will use, to the extent practical, new as well as modified existing buildings and facilities for portions of the disposition mission. DOE will analyze and compare existing and new buildings and facilities, and technology variations, in a subsequent, site-specific EIS. In addition, all disposition facilities will be designed or modified, as needed, to accommodate international inspection requirements consistent with the President's Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy. Accordingly, DOE has decided to pursue the following strategy and supporting actions for plutonium disposition:

- Immobilize plutonium materials using vitrification or ceramic immobilization at either Hanford or SRS, in new or existing facilities. Immobilization could be used for pure or impure forms of plutonium. In the subsequent EIS (referenced above), DOE anticipates that the preferred alternative for vitrification or ceramic immobilization will include the can-in-canister variant, utilizing the existing HLW and the DWPF at SRS (see below). Alternatively, new immobilization facilities could be built at Hanford or SRS. The immobilized material would be disposed of in a geologic repository. Pursuant to appropriate NEPA review, DOE will continue the research and development leading to the demonstration of the can-in-canister variant at the DWPF using surplus plutonium and the development of vitrification and ceramic formulations.

- Convert surplus plutonium materials into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for use in existing reactors. Pure surplus plutonium materials including pits, pure metal, and oxides could be converted without extensive processing into MOX fuel for use in existing commercial reactors. Other, already separated forms of surplus plutonium would require additional purification. (This purification would not involve

reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.) The Government-produced MOX fuel (from plutonium declared surplus to defense needs) would be used in existing LWRs with a once-through fuel cycle, with no reprocessing or subsequent reuse of the spent fuel. In addition, DOE will explore appropriate contractual limits to ensure that any reactor license modification for use of the MOX fuel is limited to governmental purposes involving the disposition of surplus, weapons-usable plutonium, so as to discourage general civil use of plutonium-based fuel. The spent MOX fuel would be disposed of in a geologic repository. If partially completed LWRs were to be completed by other parties, they would be considered for this mission. The MOX fuel would be fabricated in a domestic, government-owned facility at one of four DOE sites (SRS, Hanford, INEL, or Pantex).

The Department reserves as an option the potential use of some MOX fuel in CANDU reactors in Canada in the event that a multilateral agreement to deploy this option is negotiated among Russia, Canada, and the United States. DOE will engage in a test and demonstration program for CANDU MOX fuel consistent with ongoing and potential future cooperative efforts with Russia and Canada.

The test and demonstration activities could occur at LANL and at sites in Canada, potentially beginning in 1997, and will be based on appropriate NEPA review. Fabrication of MOX fuel for CANDU reactors would occur in a DOE facility, as would be true in the case of domestic LWRs. Strict security and safeguards would be employed in the fabrication and transport of MOX fuel to CANDU reactors, as well as domestic reactors. Whether, and the extent to which, the CANDU option is implemented will depend on multi-national agreements and the results of the test and demonstration activities.

Due to technology, complexity, timing, cost, and other factors that would be involved in purifying certain plutonium materials to make them suitable for potential use in MOX fuel, approximately 30 percent of the total quantity of plutonium that has been or may be declared surplus to defense needs would require extensive purification for use in MOX fuel, and therefore will likely be immobilized. Of the plutonium that is currently surplus, DOE will immobilize at least 8 metric tons that it has determined are not suitable for use in MOX fuel.<sup>26</sup> DOE

reserves the option of using the immobilization approach for all of the surplus plutonium.

The timing and extent to which either option is ultimately utilized will depend on the results of international agreements, future technology development and demonstrations, site-specific environmental review, detailed cost proposals, and negotiations with Russia and other nations. In the event both technologies are utilized, because the time required for plutonium disposition using reactors would be longer than that for immobilization, it is probable that some surplus plutonium would be immobilized initially, prior to completion of reactor irradiation for other surplus plutonium. Implementation of this strategy will involve some or all of the following supporting actions:

- Construct and operate a plutonium vitrification facility or ceramic immobilization facility at either Hanford or SRS. DOE will analyze alternative locations at these two sites for constructing new buildings or using modified existing buildings in subsequent, site-specific NEPA review. SRS has existing facilities (the DWPF) and infrastructure to support an immobilization mission, and at Hanford, DOE has proposed constructing and operating immobilization facilities for the wastes in Hanford tanks.<sup>27</sup> DOE will not create new infrastructure for immobilizing plutonium with HLW or cesium at INEL, NTS, ORR, or Pantex. Due to the substantial timing and cost advantages associated with the can-in-canister option, as discussed in the Technical Summary Report For Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium Disposition and summarized in section IV.A.2, above, DOE anticipates that the proposed action for immobilization in the follow-on plutonium disposition EIS will include the use of the can-in-canister option at the DWPF at SRS for immobilizing a portion of the surplus, non-pit plutonium material.<sup>28</sup>

30 percent (approximately 17 MT) of the surplus plutonium materials might be immobilized because they are impure. DOE's decision here that immobilization will be used for at least 8 MT currently located at SRS and RFETS is based on DOE's current assessment that that quantity of material is so low in quality that its purification for use in MOX fuel would not be cost-effective. This decision does not preclude immobilizing all of the surplus plutonium, but it does preclude using the MOX/reactor approach for all of the material.

<sup>27</sup> See Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Tank Waste Remediation System, Hanford Site, Richland, Washington (DOE/EIS-0189, August 1996); ROD expected early in 1997.

<sup>28</sup> DOE expects to issue a Notice of Intent to prepare the follow-on EIS shortly following this ROD. Reasonable alternatives for the proposed

<sup>26</sup> The S&D Final PEIS, for purposes of analysis of impacts of the preferred alternative (using both reactors and immobilization), assumed that about

- Construct and operate a plutonium conversion facility for non-pit plutonium materials at either Hanford or SRS. DOE will collocate the plutonium conversion facility with the vitrification or ceramic immobilization facility discussed above. In subsequent, site-specific NEPA review, DOE will analyze alternative locations at Hanford and SRS for constructing new buildings or using modified existing buildings for the plutonium conversion facility.

- Construct and operate a pit disassembly/conversion facility at Hanford, INEL, Pantex, or SRS (only one site). DOE will not introduce plutonium to sites that do not currently have plutonium in storage. Therefore, two sites analyzed in the S&D PEIS, NTS and ORR, will not be considered further for plutonium disposition activities. DOE will analyze alternative locations at Hanford, INEL, Pantex, and SRS for constructing new buildings or using modified existing buildings in subsequent, site-specific NEPA review. Based on appropriate NEPA review, DOE anticipates demonstrating the Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) concept at LANL for pit disassembly/conversion beginning in fiscal year 1997.

- Construct and operate a domestic, government-owned, limited-purpose MOX fuel fabrication facility at Hanford, INEL, Pantex, or SRS (only one site). As noted above, NTS and ORR will not be considered further for plutonium disposition activities. In follow-on NEPA review, DOE will analyze alternative locations at Hanford, INEL, Pantex, and SRS, for constructing new buildings or using modified existing buildings. The MOX fuel fabrication facility will serve only the limited mission of fabricating MOX fuel from plutonium declared surplus to U.S. defense needs, with shut-down and decontamination and decommissioning of the facility upon completion of this mission.<sup>29</sup>

DOE's program for surplus plutonium disposition will be subject to the highest standards of safeguards and security for storage, transportation, and processing

action will be considered in the follow-on disposition EIS.

<sup>29</sup> DOE supports external regulation of its facilities, and in the Report of Department of Energy Working Group on External Regulation (DOE/UF-0001, December 1996), DOE proposed to seek legislation that would generally require NRC licenses for new DOE facilities. Therefore, DOE anticipates seeking an NRC license for the MOX fuel fabrication facility, which would be limited to a license to fabricate MOX fuel from plutonium declared surplus to defense needs. DOE may also seek legislation that would by statute limit the MOX fuel fabrication facility to disposition of surplus plutonium.

(particularly during operations that involve the greatest proliferation vulnerability, such as during MOX fuel preparation and transportation), and will include International Atomic Energy Agency verification as appropriate. Transportation of all plutonium-bearing materials under this program, including the transportation of prepared MOX fuel to reactors, will be accomplished using the DOE Transportation Safeguards Division's "Safe Secure Transports" (SSTs), which affords these materials the same level of transportation safety, security, and safeguards as is used for nuclear weapons.

Pursuant to appropriate NEPA review(s), DOE will continue research and development and engage in further testing and demonstrations of plutonium disposition technologies which may include: dissolution of small quantities of plutonium in both glass and ceramic formulation; experiments with immobilization equipment and systems; fabrication of MOX fuel pellets for demonstrations of reactor irradiation at INEL; mechanical milling and mixing of plutonium and uranium feed; and testing of shipping and storage containers for certification, in addition to the testing and demonstrations previously described for the can-in-canister immobilization variant, the ARIES system, and other plutonium processes.

DOE has decided not to pursue several disposition alternatives that were evaluated in the S&D PEIS: two deep borehole alternatives, electrometallurgical treatment, evolutionary reactors, and partially-completed reactors (unless they were completed by others, in which case they would qualify as existing reactors). Although the deep borehole options are technically attractive, the institutional uncertainties associated with siting of borehole facilities make timely implementation of this alternative unlikely. To implement the borehole alternatives, new legislation and regulations, or clarification of existing regulations, may be necessary. DOE has decided not to pursue the electrometallurgical treatment option for immobilization because its technology is less mature than vitrification or ceramic immobilization.<sup>30</sup> DOE has decided not to pursue evolutionary reactors or partially-completed reactors because they offer no advantages over existing reactors for plutonium

<sup>30</sup> An evaluation by the National Research Council in a recent report (see footnote 12, above) concluded that the electrometallurgical treatment process is not sufficiently mature to provide a reliable basis for timely plutonium disposition.

disposition and would involve higher costs, greater regulatory uncertainties, higher environmental impacts from construction, and less timely commencement of disposition actions.

## VI. Conclusion

DOE has decided to implement a program to provide for safe and secure storage of weapons-usable fissile materials and for disposition of weapons-usable plutonium that is declared excess to national security needs (now or in the future), as specified in the Preferred Alternative in the S&D Final PEIS. DOE will consolidate the storage of weapons-usable plutonium by upgrading and expanding existing facilities at the Pantex Plant in Texas and SRS in South Carolina, continuing storage of surplus plutonium currently onsite at Hanford, LANL, and INEL pending disposition, and continuing storage of weapons-usable HEU at DOE's Y-12 Plant in Tennessee, in upgraded and, as surplus HEU is down-blended under the ROD for Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium Final Environmental Impact Statement, consolidated facilities. DOE will provide for disposition of surplus plutonium by pursuing a strategy that allows: (1) Immobilization of surplus plutonium for disposal in a repository pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, and (2) fabrication of surplus plutonium into MOX fuel, for use in existing domestic commercial reactors (and potentially CANDU reactors, depending on future agreements with Russia and Canada). The timing and extent to which each of these disposition technologies is deployed will depend upon the results of future technology development and demonstrations, site-specific environmental review, detailed cost proposals, and the results of negotiations with Russia, Canada, and other nations. This programmatic decision is effective upon being made public, in accordance with DOE's regulations implementing NEPA (10 CFR 1021.315). The goals of this program are to support U.S. nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy by reducing global stockpiles of excess fissile materials so that they may never be used in weapons again. This program will demonstrate the United States' commitment to its nonproliferation goals, as specified in the President's Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy of 1993, and provide an example for other nations, where stockpiles of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials may be less secure from potential theft or diversion than those in the United

States, to encourage them to take similar actions.

The decision process reflected in this Notice complies with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.) and its implementing regulations at 40 CFR Parts 1500–1508 and 10 CFR Part 1021.

Issued in Washington, D.C., January 14, 1997.

Hazel R. O'Leary,  
Secretary.

[FR Doc. 97–1355 Filed 1–17–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6450–01–P

## Energy Information Administration

### Agency Information Collection Activities: Proposed Collection; Comment Request

**SUMMARY:** The Energy Information Administration (EIA) is soliciting comments concerning the proposed three-year extension of existing form DOE–887, "Department of Energy Customer Surveys."

**DATES:** Written comments must be submitted on or before March 24, 1997. If you anticipate that you will be submitting comments, but find it difficult to do so within the period of time allowed by this notice, you should advise the contact listed below of your intention to do so as soon as possible.

**ADDRESSES:** Send comments to Herbert T. Miller, Office of Statistical Standards, EI–73, Forrestal Building, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. 20585, (Phone 202–426–1103, FAX 202–426–1081, or e-mail htmiller@eia.doe.gov).

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION:** Requests for additional information should be directed to Herbert Miller at the address listed above.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

- I. Background
- II. Current Actions
- III. Request for Comments

#### I. Background

In order to fulfill its responsibilities under the Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974 (Pub. L. No. 93–275) and the Department of Energy Organization Act (Pub. L. No. 95–91), the Energy Information Administration is obliged to carry out a central, comprehensive, and unified energy data and information program. As part of this program, EIA collects, evaluates, assembles, analyzes, and disseminates data and information related to energy resource reserves, production, demand, and technology, and related economic and statistical information relevant to

the adequacy of energy resources to meet demands in the near and longer term future for the Nation's economic and social needs.

The Energy Information Administration, as part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork and respondent burden (required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–13)), conducts a presurvey consultation program to provide the general public and other Federal agencies with an opportunity to comment on proposed and/or continuing reporting forms. This program helps to ensure that requested data can be provided in the desired format, reporting burden is minimized, reporting forms are clearly understood, and the impact of collection requirements on respondents can be properly assessed. Also, EIA will later seek approval by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for the collections under Section 3507(h) of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (Pub. L. No. 104–13, Title 44, U.S.C. Chapter 35).

On September 11, 1993, the President signed Executive Order No. 12862 aimed at " \* \* \* ensuring the Federal government provides the highest quality service possible to the American people." The Order discusses surveys as a means for determining the kinds and qualities of service desired by Federal Government customers and for determining satisfaction levels for existing services. These voluntary customer surveys will be used to ascertain customer satisfaction with the Department of Energy in terms of services and products. Respondents will be individuals and organizations that are the recipients of the Department's services and products. Previous customer surveys have provided useful information to the Department for assessing how well the Department is delivering its services and products and for making improvements. The results are used internally and summaries are provided to the Office of Management and Budget on an annual basis, and are used to satisfy the requirements and the spirit of Executive Order No. 12862.

#### II. Current Actions

The request to OMB will be for a three-year extension of the expiration date of approval for DOE to conduct customer surveys. During the past clearance cycle, over 20 customer surveys have been conducted by telephone and mail. (Examples of previously conducted customer surveys are available upon request.) Our planned activities in the next 3 fiscal years reflect our increased emphasis on

and expansion of these activities, including an increased use of electronic means for obtaining customer input (CD–ROM and World Wide Web).

#### III. Request for Comments

Prospective respondents and other interested parties should comment on the actions discussed in item II. The following guidelines are provided to assist in the preparation of responses.

#### General Issues

A. Is the proposed collection of information necessary, taking into account its accuracy, adequacy, and reliability, and the agency's ability to process the information it collects in a useful and timely fashion?

B. What enhancements can EIA make to the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected?

#### As a Potential Respondent

A. Average public reporting burden for a customer survey is estimated to be .25 hours per response (8,333 respondents per year x 15 minutes per response = 2,083 hours annually). Burden includes the total time, effort, or financial resources expended to generate, maintain, retain, or disclose or provide the information including: (1) reviewing instructions; (2) developing, acquiring, installing, and utilizing technology and systems for the purposes of collecting, validating, verifying, processing, maintaining, disclosing and providing information; (3) adjusting the existing ways to comply with any previously applicable instructions and requirements; (4) training personnel to respond to a collection of information; (5) searching data sources; (6) completing and reviewing the collection of information; and (7) transmitting, or otherwise disclosing the information.

Please comment on (1) the accuracy of our estimate and (2) how the agency could minimize the burden of the collection of information, including the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology.

B. EIA estimates that respondents will incur no additional costs for reporting other than the hours required to complete the collection. What is the estimated (1) total dollar amount annualized for capital and start-up costs and (2) recurring annual dollar amount of operation and maintenance and purchase of services costs associated with this data collection? The estimates should take into account the costs associated with generating, maintaining, and disclosing or providing the information.